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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper deals with bus contracts procured by Stockholm County Public Transport 
Authority (SL). It aims to find out how the incentives used over the last years have worked.  
 
We have done this by comparing the average values of the quality variable before and after an 
incentive has been introduced and calculated if the differences are statistically significantly 
different from naught. If the difference is statistically significant and has the desired sign we 
consider the incentive to have worked well.  
 
Procurement of public transport and in particular bus transport started in the beginning of the 
1990-ties after re-regulation of the public transport industry. SL was among the first Public 
Transport Authorities to take advantage of the possibility to procure bus transport. These 
procurements developed into an experiment workshop where different forms of contract 
forms were tried.  
 
In a previous study Jansson (2002) discussed one of the incentives applied by SL:  to 
encourage more demand and revenue. Jansson argued that such incentives could induce 
adaptations of the transport supply that was not socially efficient. The paper also pointed at 
difficulties in providing the correct magnitude of the incentives. 
 
The cost outcome of procurement of bus transport in Stockholm, and in Sweden in general, 
has been the topic in several studies, e.g., Jansson (1993), Alexandersson, Fölster and Hultén 
(1996) and Alexandersson and Pyddoke (2003). 
                                                 
* Vinnova, a Swedish research grant agency, financed this work. The Stockholm County Public Transport 
Authority (SL) has contributed with substantial information. 
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From 1996 SL has tried a set of incentives designed to improve quality. These incentives were 
tied to particular indicators of quality, some of which had been used even before 1996. 
 
In this paper we will focus on these quality incentives. As far as we know this is the first 
study in Sweden of the effects of incentives on quality outcomes.  
 
Since this is a pilot study we have only coded the results for a selection of three contract areas 
in the Stockholm County of around 25 in total.  
 
In section 2 we will present the kind of data we have used. In section 3 the method employed 
is described. Results are in section 4. Conclusions are found in section 5. 
 
2 DATA 
 
SL has several different datasets relevant for our purpose. SL has also by itself and by 
commissioning various consultants conducted a number of studies of quality in bus transport. 
Therefore data is scattered in several sources. The primary variables we have used are 
presented below. 
 
 
2.1 Types of data used 
 
2.1.1 Cancelled departures 
 
The operator in charge of a particular bus line records cancellations. For each cancellation the 
operator pays a fine. If SL detects that an operator fails to report a cancelled departure and SL 
the fine charged is significantly higher. 
 
 
2.1.2 Quality monitoring 
 
Since 2003 SL procures a consultant firm to monitor a set of quality dimensions by so called 
“mystery shoppers” who travel in the bus system and record the following dimensions. 
 
 cleanliness of the vehicles, 
 presence of litter, 
 presence of graffiti, 
 cleanliness of bus stops,  
 presence of litter at bus stops,  
 graffiti at bus stops, 
 the service attitude of personnel, 
 if the bus driver calls out bus stop names 
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2.1.3 Passenger complaints  
 
Passengers can complain by telephone or e-mail. The complaints are categorized as follows 
 
 the state of a bus stop or terminal,  
 the state of the vehicle,  
 the conduct of personnel,  
 the quality of traffic in terms of for example cancelled or delayed trips. 
 
A special company owned jointly by the PTA and the bus operators collects these complaints.  
 
 
2.1.4 Technical punctuality 
 
For this quality dimension automatic equipment is mounted on the vehicles. This equipment is 
circulated systematically among vehicles and different lines during a year. The equipment 
registers deviations in arrival and departure times compared to schedule as well as if the bus 
arrives at the terminal stop before departure time, as it should. 
 
 
2.1.5 Interviews with passengers  
 
A total of 20 000 passenger interviews are conducted during spring and autumn each year. 
Passengers rate the services in the following dimensions: 
 
 punctuality, 
 conduct of personnel,  
 driving performance, 
 cleanliness of vehicle 
 cleanliness of bus stop 
 quality of information about delays and cancellations 
 
 
2.2 Collection of data  
 
For this study we received data from SL for each procurement and winning operator for the 
years between 1993 and 2003.  
 
SL prepared the necessary data about when and where incentives were introduced in the 
different contract areas. These data were coded as variables 0 and respectively 1 for the 
indication of presence of incentives.  
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3 METHOD  
 
3.1 Statistical analysis 
 
Explained variables are the various kinds of quality measures. Explanatory variables, on the 
other hand, may be both different kinds of incentives as well as other potential explanatory 
variables as business cycles or cost development.  
 
The data available from SL includes both dependent variables and potentially explanatory 
variables for the effects, for each contract area for each period. Each month in the table 
represents a separate observation.   
 
All kinds of data are not available for all kinds of incentives. Punctuality is a quality 
dimension for which there are data for the longest period of time, since 1996. For the other 
dimensions measurements commenced 1998. The various incentives in turn have been 
introduced between 1994 and 2002. The following table gives an overview of starting points 
for measurements and incentives. 
 
Table 3.1.1 Measurements and incentives for various quality variables 
Quality factor/ 
method 
First measurement, 
year 
Measurement  
frequency, 
times per year 
First 
Incentive, year 
Passenger rating 2000 2 (20 000 interviews) 2001 
Cancelled departures 1998 Continuous 1994 
Monitoring (MSS) 2003 4 2001 
Punctuality 1996 12 1994 
Complaints 1998 Continuous - 
Bus at stop in advance 1996 Continuous 1999 
 
The measure of punctuality for example, is available for each departure, each line and 
contract area for the sample of buses that carried the equipment for automatic registration 
according to a fixed scheme. For the present project these data have to be aggregated in some 
way. A problem that we discussed in the study was that the bus stops for which punctuality 
was measured were not stable over time. The purpose was to measure at the bus stops with the 
largest flows in both directions. But because the largest flows have shifted so has the bus 
stops, and the changing flows have also redefined the functions of some bus stops. In this 
study we have used measurements from departure stops even when these bus stops are not the 
largest in terms of flow. The purpose of this choice is twofold, firstly being that the flows at 
departure stops have been more stable, secondly that fewer external factors as congestion may 
influence punctuality at the departure stop.  
 
 
3.2 Tests of incentives - method 
 
For the test we looked for sequences where we had data on the quality outcomes before as 
well as after the incentive was introduced. We found a number of such sequences in the three 
selected contract areas Råsta-Solna, Råsta-Sollentuna and Söderort. Thereafter we calculated 
the following statistical tests.   
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The method is simple. We assume that the variables are normally distributed and we use a 
statistical standard test for comparison of two means from two different samples. These 
samples are assumed drawn from two different stochastic variables X1 and X2, from 
distributions with unknown means and variances. We want to test the hypothesis that the 
mean of the first stochastic variable X1 that is μ1 equals the mean of the other stochastic 
variable X2 that is μ 2 against the hypothesis that the mean of X1 that is μ 1 is larger than or 
less than the mean of X2 that is μ 2. We do this by observing the mean of the sample 1x  is 
larger or less than the mean of the second sample 2x . We calculate the difference 21 xx − . But 
if we take in to account that there is a positive variance for both μ 1 and for μ 2, then the 
difference between 1x  and 2x  may vary between different samples from X1 and X2. We 
therefore calculate the likelihood that the null hypothesis is true given that we observe 21 xx − . 
To do this we create the test statistic T that is t-distributed and compare the obtained value 
with the t-distribution.  
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If the observed value of T is sufficiently far from zero we conclude that the null hypothesis is 
false at a certain degree of significance. We may for example calculate a value of T such that 
the likelihood that we observe has a value of T that is larger than this, if 1 and  2 are equal, is 
less than 1 percent. If we then observe a value of T that is larger than this value we say that 
we may reject the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent significance level. 
 
 
3.3 Available data in Råsta-Solna and Råsta-Sollentuna 
 
For both these contract areas incentives had been introduced for making the bus available to 
passengers before departure time. At the terminal the drivers should advance till the stop and 
let passengers board before time of departure. This is measured as the number of minutes 
before departure time that the bus was made available to the passengers per a certain number 
of departures.  
 
3.4 Available data in Söderort 
 
For Söderort we found analysable data for: 
 
3.4.1 Incentive for late departure  
 
Late departure is measured as the number of minutes after departure time that the bus 
departed per a certain number of departures. We have data on late departures in this contract 
area from January 1996 to December 2003. We have 69 observations before the incentive was 
introduced and 27 observations after.  
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3.4.2 Incentive for the total number of complaints  
 
Complaints are measured as the total number of complaints per a certain number of 
departures. We have data on complaints from April 1998 to December 2003. We have 43 
observations before the incentive was introduced and in October 2001 and 26 observations 
after. 
 
 
3.4.3 Incentive for passenger quality ratings  
 
Besides the direct measurements SL also used interviews with passengers to capture the 
subjective satisfaction with the services. In the interviews passengers rate their perceptions of 
quality scale from not satisfied over indifferent to satisfied. The variable we use is the 
proportion of the passengers that have responded with satisfied. 
 
The quality dimensions are: 
 total rating, 
 cleanliness  
 quality of information about delays and cancellations, 
 conduct of personnel, 
 
4  RESULTS 
 
4.1 Results contract areas Råsta-Solna and Råsta-Sollentuna 
 
The table below shows results for the variable “bus at stop in advance” for these areas. 
 
Table 4.1.1 Results for Råsta-Solna. Bus available in advance at the stop 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
incentive incentive incentive incentive T
Bus at stop Sep. 96 Aug. 99 improvement
in advance to Dec 03 to Dec 04 35 53 2.95 3.77 -8.45 1 % level
No. of observations
 
 
Thus, the time during which the buses are available to passengers before departure has 
increased since the incentive was introduced. 
 
Table 4.1.2 Results for Råsta-Sollentuna. Bus available in advance at the stop 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
incentive incentive incentive incentive T
Bus at stop Sep. 96 Aug. 99 worsening
in advance to Dec 03 to Dec 04 35 53 3.91 2.99 7.22 1 % level
No. of observations
 
 
The time during which the buses are available to passengers before departure has decreased 
since the incentive was introduced. 
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4.2  Conclusions on incentives in Råsta-Solna and Råsta-Sollentuna 
 
For these contract areas we find the surprising result that the incentive for bus available at 
stop in advance has opposite effects in Sollentuna and Solna. In addition these effects are 
statistical significant for both contract areas.  
 
 
4.3 Results contract area Söderort 
 
The table below shows results for the variables: 
 
 late departure, 
 passenger complaints, 
 conduct of personnel according to complaints, 
 total quality rating, 
 cleanliness in vehicle, 
 information on delays and cancelled departures, 
 conduct of personnel according to interviews. 
 
Table 4.3.1 Results for Söderort. Late departures 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
incentive incentive incentive incentive T
Late Jan. 96 Jan. 02
departure to Dec 03 to Dec 04 69 27 38.57 36.11 -3.56 improvement
No. of observations
 
  
The late departures have decreased significantly after the incentives were introduced. 
 
Table 4.3.2 Results for Söderort. Total number of complaints 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
incentive incentive incentive incentive T
Passenger Apr. 98 Oct. 01
complaints to Sep. 03 to Dec 04 43 26 87.62 111.1 -3.46 worsening
No. of observations
 
 
The total number of complaints has increased significantly since the incentives were 
introduced.  
 
Table 4.3.3 Results for Söderort. Conduct of personnel according to complaints 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
Conduct of incentive incentive incentive incentive T
personnel Apr. 98 Oct. 01
Complaints to Dec 03 to Dec 04 42 27 15.71 21.44 -3.33 worsening
No. of observations
 
 
The number of complaints for conduct has increased significantly since the incentives were 
introduced.  
 
Table 4.3.4 Results for Söderort. Total rating 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
incentive incentive incentive incentive T
Total quality May. 00 Oct. 01 Improvement
rating to Dec 03 to Dec 04 4 4 58.75 66.25 -2.42 10 % level
No. of observations
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The total rating has there fore increased significantly since the incentives were introduced.  
 
Table 4.3.5 Results for Söderort. Cleanliness in vehicles 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
incentive incentive incentive incentive T
Cleanliness May. 00 Oct. 01 not
in vehicle to Dec 03 to Dec 04 4 4 53.50 62.00 -2.04 significant
No. of observations
 
 
The rating for cleanliness in vehicles has not increased significantly since the incentives were 
introduced. 
 
Table 4.3.6 Results for Söderort. Information about delays and cancellations 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
Information on incentive incentive incentive incentive T
delays and May. 00 Oct. 01 not
cancellations to Dec 03 to Dec 04 4 4 19.75 21.00 -0.56 significant
No. of observations
 
 
The rating for quality of information about delays and cancellations has not increased 
significantly since the incentives were introduced.  
 
Table 4.3.7 Results for Söderort. Conduct of personnel according to interviews 
Measurements Incentives Average Average Test Quality
during during before after without  with variable change
Conduct of incentive incentive incentive incentive T
personnel May. 00 Oct. 01 not
Interviews to Dec 03 to Dec 04 4 4 67.75 71.50 -1.71 significant
No. of observations
 
 
The rating for conduct of personnel has not increased significantly since the incentives were 
introduced.  
 
 
4.4  Conclusions on incentives in Söderort 
 
The incentives seem to have influenced the number of late departure in the desired direction. 
The total rating of quality has also gone the right way. Cleanliness, information about delays 
and cancellations and conduct has not improved significantly. The number of complaints has 
increased significantly both totally and for conduct. The development of different quality 
ratings is therefore equivocal.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY  
 
The primary purpose of this pilot study preliminary study was to find out if an analysis of 
quality incentives for bus services was at all possible with the kind of data that exists in SL: s 
databases. The answer is that available data can be used both for evaluation of how quality 
has evolved and how incentives have worked. 
 
We have also been able to make some further observations that may be useful for further 
evaluation and development of the incentives.  
 
 The introduction of incentives seems to have proceeded in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. In 
some cases measurements of the quality variables has been commenced in good time 
before the incentive and sometimes not. There does not seem to have been any conscious 
plan to evaluate incentives. 
 
 The number of incentives is large and varying and it is not always clear why a particular 
incentive has been chosen.  
 
 Not all incentives have been paired with quality measurements.  
 
 There are quality measurements for variables that lack a corresponding incentive.  
 
The reason for this situation – a lack of structure – appears to be a result of ambitions on the 
part of SL to try out new incentive forms.  
 
The statistical tests that we have conducted in the present pilot study for three contract areas 
suggests that four incentives worked well and had the desired effects and that three incentives 
did not work well, whereas two incentives did not seem to have any significant effect. From 
this one may not conclude that the full set of incentives for the whole set of bus contracts has 
not produced quality improvements and a positive net welfare. That would clearly be a 
premature conclusion from these limited calculations. The paper does however show that both 
data and methods allow for meaningful evaluation of the design of individual incentives and 
that these methods could be applied to the whole set of contracts. 
 
Since the method of analysis seems to work well and since the data collected by SL is 
comprehensive and well structured it would be most interesting to carry out a full study by 
use of all data for all contract areas. One could then also use both cross-series and time-series 
data, and combinations of the two. 
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